Posts Tagged ‘Franchise Buyers’

The New FTC Franchise Rule – Franchise Disclosure Documents (FDD)

Sunday, July 4th, 2010

Since the new FTC Franchise Rule became effective in 2007, many persons wonder what the major differences are between the old Uniform Franchise Offering Circular (UFOC) and the new FTC Franchise Disclosure Document (FDD). Of particular interest to franchise companies is how long it takes to convert an old UFOC to the new FDD format. Franchise buyers wonder if anything has changed about when an FDD must be given to them under the new regulations.

FDD vs. UFOC

In summary, what the FTC’s new Franchise Disclosure Document or FDD format does is take the prior Uniform Franchise Offering Circular disclosures, modify them in certain respects and rename the document. It’s now called a Franchise Disclosure Document or FDD. There are still 23 individual Items (chapters) and although the revisions are not that substantive, they are numerous. A franchise attorney familiar with the new FDD format should be able to convert the old UFOC to a new FDD within ten to twenty hours, plus or minus. The Table of Contents for an FDD can be found within the information at the franchise a business page of the Franchise Foundations website.

FDD Phase In Period

The phase in period for the FDD is now over. The new FDD format was permissive starting July 1, 2007. It became mandatory starting July 1, 2008. So franchise companies cannot make any offers or sales using or distributing the old UFOC. The new FDD is the required format in all states as of July 1, 2008.

New FTC Franchise Rule Transactional Changes

A transactional change with the new FDD rules and regulations relates to the time a prospective franchisee must have the document in their hands before contacts can be signed or any money paid. The former rule said the UFOC had to be delivered at the "first personal meeting" and in hand for at least ten business days. A seperate, completed franchise agreement also had to be delivered to the prospective franchisee for at least five business days. Under the new FTC franchise rule, the first personal meeting requirement is eliminated, replaced with a fourteen calendar day minimum review period that simplifies the complexity of completing franchise transactions. There’s another seven calendar day contract reiew period that kicks in if the franchise company makes unilateral and material changes to the franchise agreement (or other agreement) attached to the FDD.

Electronic Delivery of FDD

Stepping into the 21st century, the new FTC Rule permits delivery of the FDD by electronic means, such as email and downloading from a website. The cover page of the FDD now contains the franchise company’s website and email address.

Copyright 2008-2009 Kevin B. Murphy, B.S., M.B.A., J.D. – all rights reserved

For more informatiion, visit the Franchise Foundations website.

Buying a Franchise – Mr. Franchise (and Mrs. Franchise) Buy Their First Franchise

Saturday, September 5th, 2009

For the last twenty-eight years, as a franchise attorney, author, instructor and recognized franchise expert, I’ve helped firms enter and prosper in the franchise industry – each hoping to become the next “McDonalds” of their respective industries. Along the way, I’ve met and worked with an interesting group of entrepreneurial founders. From apparel to water treatment, the franchised concepts were also incredibly diverse. Some of them interested me to the point where I considered buying a franchise myself. In two or three cases, talks were initiated to discuss the possibility, but never moved forward. I just couldn’t find the precise set of criteria to satisfy my exacting requirements. After all, I had advised hundreds of prospective franchise buyers, and developed sophisticated radar for detecting the good, the bad and the ugly in franchise investments.

In May of 2002, my life changed dramatically as I took the plunge and became a first-time franchise owner. I’d just completed a franchise development project for a San Francisco Peninsula company poised to enter franchising. They operated a very successful home improvement business that specialized in a unique niche. Targeting homes constructed in the 1960’s to the 1980’s having old, flat, ugly interior doors, this company replaced all interior doors in a home with new, freshly-painted raised panel designer doors, locksets and hinges. Their advertising mantra was “Replacing America’s 1.16 Billion Interior Doors.”

After interviewing a couple interested franchise candidates who didn’t sign up, the company became concerned about selling its first franchise. Selling the first one is usually the most challenging task facing any new franchise company. There are no other franchise owners a prospective buyer can talk to about financial performance, training, ongoing support and other franchise relationship issues. Because of this void, selling the first one is difficult. After I was repeatedly asked when they could expect to sell their first franchise, my hand finally jumped up and I volunteered for the assignment. After discussing the venture with my wife Linh Luu-Murphy, who agreed to take a hiatus from her successful Napa Valley foot reflexology massage business to help me, our franchise agreement was signed May 22, 2002.

Let’s consider the major assumptions and factors I evaluated in making my buying a franchise investment decision, and see how things worked out.

INDUSTRY TREND

As stated in the previous franchise article, a major issue is finding a franchise in a cutting-edge industry that is doing well currently and is projected to do well in the future despite any economic slowdown. From my experience in evaluating hundreds of franchises, I observed the home-improvement industry was a stable segment. People are always looking for ways to improve the appearance and value of their homes.

Unlike other home improvement companies that concentrate on a single, high ticket improvement (a kitchen remodel, for example, that can cost $50,000 and more), for a couple thousand dollars ($2,000 to $5,000), a homeowner can give every room in their entire home a major face lift by replacing their old, flat doors with new raised panel, designer doors. In the aftermath of the 9-11 attacks, and the country’s high security anxiety, I felt more people than ever would be nesting at home. A home typically represents the most valuable asset in a family’s portfolio. If the homeowner can be educated and motivated to improve the appearance and value of this asset, by making a reasonable investment, sales are easy.

Major home improvement chains, like Home Depot, realized this and were aggressively promoting interior door replacement. However, they were not organized to meet the needs of the target market in a cost-effective manner. The franchise company had discovered and perfected the “do-it-right” approach for this market, and actually welcomed competitive bids from the Home Depot and other large home improvement chains. In my estimation, all of this bode well for home improvements in general, and this franchise company in particular.

TOTAL INITIAL FRANCHISE INVESTMENT

The franchise company estimated initial franchise investment between $127,00 and $180,000 in its Franchise Offering Circular. Turned out, we came in below the low end of the range. Including the $20,000 in franchise fees and the $78,000 I used against a home equity line of credit, our total investment was just under $100,000. Incredibly, this was enough to get the business operational AND reach the critical break-even point where cash flow paid all the bills. As discussed in the other franchise article, reaching the break-even point in many businesses can take a year, two years or more.

Getting operational happened fairly quickly. From the time my wife Linh and I signed the franchise agreement at the end of May, 2002, secured the real estate in mid-July, 2002, completed improvements then training in August, 2002, and began operations like a rocket in the first week of September, 2002, about four months elapsed. We hit the break-even point in mid-October, 2002, just six weeks after operations started, and began to accumulate an ever-increasing balance in the business savings account.

When we sold our franchise in September of 2003, our interior door replacement business was rocking and rolling. Residential home owners negotiated for position on our six to eight week waiting list to get their old, ugly, flat interior doors replaced with new raised-panel, designer interior doors and shinny lock sets. The new owner paid $236,000 for our franchise, and we received $235,000 after escrow fees. Subtracting our $100,000 investment left a tidy $135,000 profit. Not bad for operating the business exactly one year, and this didn’t include operating monthly income before the business was sold.

REAL BUSINESS

We operated a retail business with a storefront, as opposed to a “work out of your home” operation.

FRANCHISE MANAGEMENT EXPERTISE

The management team of the franchisor had no past achievement and experience in operating a franchise company. They had just started the franchise company and were learning on the fly. That was definitely a major risk. However, I’d given them detailed seminars on how to operate a franchise company and manage franchise relationships based on my twenty-plus years of franchise industry expertise, and had every reason to believe they’d follow my advice. And, because I was their very first franchise, I also believed they would do everything it took to make us a success. My goal was to develop the first franchise from scratch, build it up, then either develop other franchises for them, or sell out – depending on what happened in the franchise relationship. We opted to sell out.

NORMAL WORKING HOURS AND DAYS; SUFFICIENT INCOME LEVEL – FRANCHISE PROFITS AND FRANCHISE PROFITABILITY

The nature of this business was a normal five-day, forty-hour workweek. Our business hours were 9A to 5P, Monday through Friday initially. After talking with the owner of the second franchise in early 2003, I discovered and copied his idea of a forty-hour work week spread over four, instead of five days.

Although this meant our employees needed to work four ten-hour days, they were very receptive to the idea. By starting on Monday and getting all door orders for the week installed by Thursday, everyone had a three day weekend every week, not just on an occasional holiday. Of course, I didn’t have to work ten hours a day. I arrived by 10 a.m. and usually finished by 4 p.m. – Monday through Thursday. Supervising four employees, working 24 hours a week and having 3-day weekends off every week – try finding that in another franchise!

What about the financial picture? Let’s take June of 2003, our tenth month
of operations when we started interviewing a number of interested buyers. Sales were $47,000 less expenses of $35,500, left an income that month of $11,500. Of course other months varied, and the business was still in the start-up development stage operating with only a single crew of four employees – but you get the idea. Using the results for June and multiplying by twelve for an annual result, we’d entered financial performance territory only enjoyed by a select group in the entire franchise industry.

MINIMUM NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES

Remember my key question here: can you operate the business with six or fewer employees? When we started business operations in September, 2002, we had two employees. A month later, we added another. When the business sold a year later, our crew consisted of one part-time and three full-time employees, plus me and my super-energetic wife, Linh Luu-Murphy.

LEASING AND LOCATION

Our interior door replacement business operated from a low rent commercial business zone, so high square foot rent and triple net leases were never a concern. The 7,200 square foot warehouse and retail showroom we settled on in San Carlos, CA, with rent starting at $0.65 per foot the first year, seemed almost too big (and expensive) initially. Cutting a rental check to the landlord for about $5,000 every month, by far our biggest initial operating expense, made my heart race while I thought “is this whole thing going to work and how long will it take to reach the break-even point?” But, as things turned out, our location was perfect, sales were never an issue, and we hit break-even just six weeks after operations started.

Due to the size of our facility and nature of the interior door replacement business, three crews were possible and bringing them online, one crew at a time, would double then ultimately triple sales. Also, because we were the first to enter the franchise system, we selected the very lucrative, exclusive territory that stretched from Palo Alto, CA all the way up to San Francisco, CA. Although we never expanded the business beyond a single crew, these “next steps” in the evolution of the business in such a prime territory were strong selling points. The new owner of our franchise ultimately took the next steps and with three crews enjoys weekly sales of $30K to $35K – which is over $1.5 million per year.

IMAGE AND LIFESTYLE

I didn’t need to flip burgers, scoop ice cream or clean restrooms. As a franchise co-owner, my principal job was creating and maintaining client relations. I placed ads designed by the franchise company, responded to customer phone calls, set up appointments, did estimates and sent out contracts. A lot of my working time was spent driving to customer’s homes, meeting with them over coffee, taking measurements of all their interior doors, going over the options and explaining our one week production cycle – picking up their old doors on a Monday and installing the new doors by Thursday.

Back at the office, I’d enter the estimate information in our computer and generate a contract proposal. Then I’d email or fax the contract to the customer and wait for their deposit. About 70% of the proposals turned into jobs. Customers called back, gave me their credit card billing information, faxed in the signed contract and I scheduled their production week. By the time we sold the business in September of 2003, residential homeowners negotiated for position on our six to eight week waiting list to get their interior doors replaced.

I also ordered the new doors, lock sets, hinges, paint and accessories. Finally, I paid the bills. It was a very efficient business, great cash flow, no billing and no waiting for payment. As I look back, I saw some very nice homes and met some very interesting people. The pickup, production, painting and installation process was handled directly by our employees under the supervision of our contractor, so I wasn’t involved in this aspect – although I did go out with our crew for about three months picking up and installing doors. That way, I understood the process firsthand, and this helped considerably in knowing how to bid jobs and cover contingencies in the contract.

TRUE FRANCHISE VALUE

My wife and I knew going in this franchise investment was not with an established ‘blue chip’ franchise company. After all, we’d purchased their very first franchise, becoming the ground breakers, the pioneers – willing to accept a much greater degree of risk than other franchise buyers. In return, we expected an adequate level of support from the franchise company. Virtually every new franchise company gives not only adequate, but extra support to its first franchise to compensate for that franchisee’s help in pioneering the new franchise system and the additional risk they’ve assumed. There’s also a self-interest in providing extra support – the future growth of the franchise network hinges on the success of the first franchise.

The ultimate test of franchise value came in November of 2002. I was en-route, driving our box van, jamb-packed with doors, power tools, lock sets, hinges, etc., headed to our biggest installation job yet, with our contractor, Scotty, who supervised our team and was our franchisor-approved manager. Everyone else was back at the shop, frantically cutting, sanding and painting the rest of the 100-plus doors scheduled for other jobs that week.

Knowing we had taken on the busiest week of our fledgling business, contractor Scotty complained all week about his wages, saying he wasn’t being paid enough. I’d explained, numerous times, our cash flow wouldn’t support any pay increases at the moment, that he’d only been working for us a little over two months, and his pay was exactly what he requested when we hired him. Scotty wasn’t listening and his complaints continued during our drive along El Camino Real to the client’s house. We were stopped at a red light, waiting to make a turn when Scotty abruptly announced “I’m out of here, I quit.” Opening the passenger door, he jumped out, and walked quickly down the sidewalk of El Camino Real, leaving me stranded in a van that’s a bit larger than a UPS delivery truck. Scotty believed he was indispensable and his theatrics were nothing but a hardball, power play for money.

Looking back at all those freshly painted doors in the van, I knew there was no way one person could install them. I completed my turn, pulled over, and called our shop with my cell phone. Our main door cutter and best employee, Brian, confirmed what I already knew. He could leave and meet me for the install, but that would throw off our entire schedule for the week.

Then, I remembered something important. “That’s why I bought a franchise,” I thought to myself, “we’re in business for ourselves, but not by ourselves.” Surely the franchise company would know exactly what to do, and help us, their very first franchise, deal with a problem that could cripple or kill our new business. They were just a short twenty-minute drive away, had multiple crews, etc. I called the founder, Mr. Interior Door himself.

The first thing Mike said, after I’d related my predicament was: “Do you think Scott will start a competing business?” I assured him that wasn’t even remotely possible. Starting a door business usually cost upwards of $350,000, requires a sizeable warehouse-showroom, power tools, delivery van and other things. Scotty, besides his tools, had no assets. He’d even moved into our warehouse from day one so he didn’t have to pay rent and lived paycheck to paycheck.

I quickly redirected Mike to the purpose of my call and asked for his advice and H-E-L-P. Perhaps a couple of his door installers for the rest of the week, at my expense? Answer – no. What about one person for the rest of the day? Answer – no. What about one person f
or just a couple hours? Same answer – no. Incredibly, Mr. Interior Door said he couldn’t spare even a single person (including himself) for a couple hours to help us out.

So, no help – but what about advice? Mike’s only advice: call all our customers, including the one I was en-route to, tell them we couldn’t make it this week and re-schedule all jobs forward a week. Since we’d already booked other jobs over the next two weeks, this would have been a disaster, not only to our cash flow (payroll, rent and supplier bills were due that week) but also for our customers who’d already scheduled time off work to be at their homes on the scheduled dates.

That’s when I realized we were in business for ourselves . . . and by ourselves. After thinking things over in the silent van, I called the shop and told Brian to meet me at the customer’s home for the installation. I figured at least we’d collect $4,000 doing this job and just have to see about the rest of the week. By the time Brian and I finished, the day was over. We arrived back at the shop at 4 p.m. – quitting time for our construction workers. Our door jobs for the next day were not even close to being finished. The crisis was finally upon us – should I follow Mike’s advice, call all our customers and try to reschedule for the following week?

Linh and I decided on a different approach. We held a little meeting, explained the situation, and asked our employees if they’d be willing to work overtime, so our new business wouldn’t go out of business. We also fully realized our employee’s concerns. They’d been working very hard that week to help us achieve our ambitious goal. Our team leader, Scotty, was history, and they all had families and responsibilities at home. Under normal circumstances we’d be up the proverbial creek without a paddle.

LINH LUU’S MANAGEMENT STYLE TO THE RESCUE

Fortunately, my wife’s management style was about to pay off. Born and raised in Vietnam, and used to working in a number of family-owned Asian businesses, Linh convinced me from the very beginning to treat our employees in Asian tradition, like members of our family. It was a very extended version of theory “Y” management style I’d studied in my graduate business classes. Everyday, we bought lunch for all employees and ate together, discussing what was new in their lives as well as exchanging door stories. We also provided soft drinks, coffee and snacks throughout the day at the shop. On birthdays, we’d take the person out to a movie of their choice and dinner afterwards.

Luckily, we didn’t have that many employees, but every month saw an ever-increasing total for these benefits on our profit and loss statement. I questioned Linh about it, reminding her Mr. Interior Door only provided employee meals once every couple months for a special occasion. Linh always had the same reply – “don’t worry, it’s the right thing to do and if we ever need them, they’ll be there for us.” As part of her management style, Linh also accompanied our crew on door installation days and hung doors right along side them. It was amazing to see this little Asian-American woman carry solid core doors that weighed as much as she did into the customer’s home, and install them right with our team – a definite morale booster. Linh told our crew “This boss likes to get involved.”

Linh’s management style kept our business in business and on track that November. All employees immediately agreed to work overtime. I ordered pizzas for everyone for dinner and they worked from 5 p.m. until 1 a.m. the next morning. This dedication repeated itself over the next two days, which is nothing short of incredible, given they all had to report back to work at 7 a.m. each morning. We completed all jobs scheduled for that week, collected our money and all customers were very satisfied. By the next week, the business was on track, humming along, and strengthened by overcoming the adversity.

SUMMARY

Looking back, we happened to be in the right place at the right time, and were willing to take a calculated risk. We didn’t rush in, took a lot of time evaluating many factors, and kept emotions out of the franchise investment decision – thus avoiding the three mistakes made by most franchise buyers.

It was definitely an effort getting the business established, finding the right location, the right workers, and navigating a new business on our own. But the challenges were a learning experience, and overcoming them was very rewarding. Although I’ve advised hundreds of individuals and firms about the in’s and out’s of franchising, the insights gained and lessons learned in operating my own franchise and interacting with the franchise company retooled my knowledge of franchise relationships.

© 2003-2008, Kevin B. Murphy, B.S., M.B.A., J.D. – all rights reserved

For more information, visit the Franchise Foundations website

 

Franchise Disclosure Documents (FDD) – Mission Accomplished?

Tuesday, May 12th, 2009

Franchise Disclosure Documents (FDD) under the FTC’s new Franchise Rule continue to be a good concept in theory. Unfortunately, reality plays a more important role and reveals an entirely different picture.

Here are some of my observations, based on twenty-eight plus years of experience in the franchise industry as a franchise attorney, franchise expert and former franchise owner. During this time, I’ve drafted, reviewed and negotiated over 500 Franchise Disclosure Documents.

Franchise Disclosure Goals

Franchise Disclosure Documents or FDD (formerly known as Uniform Franchise Offering Circulars) are a document containing twenty-three chapters of information. These disclosures are intended to give prospective franchise buyers enough pre-sale information so an intelligent franchise investment decision can be made before long-term contracts are signed, money changes hands and sizeable financial commitments are made. In most cases, a franchise investment has long-term financial consequences. It means putting everything on the line – savings, retirement accounts, home equity, etc. With all this at stake, it’s easy to see why the disclosures in the FDD are so important.

Aura Of Credibility

Attached as exhibits to the FDD are the franchise company’s audited financial statements, franchise agreement, and a list of operating (and departed) franchise owners. If the company elects to make a franchise "Earnings Claim," that information will be set forth either in Item 19 or attached as another exhibit. The entire document is quite lengthy and can exceed several hundred pages. In certain states (known as franchise registration states like California, New York, Illinois, etc.) the FDD makes reference to being registered with the state. All these formalities creates an aura of credibility. Many franchise buyers assume a regulatory agency has reviewed and approved the franchise offering. Unscrupulous franchise companies engage in blatant misrepresentation, referring to their franchise registration with a state as that state’s "stamp of approval." Nothing could be further from the truth.

Franchise Registration Realities

First of all, registration of a company’s Franchise Disclosure Document only means they’ve paid a registration fee to a governmental agency and submitted their document. There are no standards a franchise company must meet before it can sell franchises, such as business experience, financial stability, operating a successful prototype for a certain period of time before franchising, etc.

Business Experience And Financial Stability?

You and I could have no experience in a business concept, and never operated a prototype. All we have is an idea to franchise, letting other people (franchise buyers) risk their savings, homes, etc. to see if our idea pans out in the marketplace. All we need to do to franchise is put together a Franchise Disclosure Document, and capitalize our new franchise corporation or LLC. Let’s say we don’t want to risk anything ourselves, so we decide to capitalize our new franchise corporation with only $1. After producing an audited financial statement (showing $1 cash and stock issued for $1), and including this financial in our Franchise Disclosure Document, we’d be able to sell franchises with impunity and collect our $50,000 franchise fee every time we sell a franchise.

Franchise Registration States

Of course, in the U.S. there are about 14 franchise registration states where we’d have to pay a registration fee and file the document with the appropriate state agency. But that’s just a rubber stamp and no registration state will refuse to register our franchise offering. Because we’re “thinly capitalized” these states may require an escrow condition where we don’t receive the franchise fee until the franchisee opens for business. Or these registration states may just say we can’t accept payment of the franchise fee until the franchisee opens, and require a simple amendment to our franchise agreement to reflect this condition. That’s the trend here in California and the bottom line is we’d get “registered.”

Even franchise examiners (who are usually attorneys) in registration states issue registration renewal orders to franchise companies who have been operating a couple years and whose audited financial statements say (in an brief footnote): "Since its inception, the franchise company has incurred a net loss of $X million. These and other factors indicate substantial doubt the Company will be able to continue as a going concern." Translation: the auditors are saying the company’s ready to go broke. Result: Not to worry, the franchise examiners issue renewal orders allowing them to sell franchises to unsuspecting buyers. It’s not right, in fact it’s outrageous, yet it happens.

Franchise Non-Registration States; FTC To The Rescue?

In the balance of the non-registration states (36) we’d be able to sell franchises with impunity and no regulatory oversight. Of course, there’s the Federal Trade Commission’s FTC Franchise Rule that applies in all states. But this only requires producing a franchise disclosure document – FDD. There’s no registration process with the FTC and they rarely get involved in franchise complaints. A 1993 government report found the FTC acted on less than 6% of all franchise complaints. The U.S. General Accounting Office reports that franchise complaints to the FTC from franchise owners increased ten-fold from 1997-1999. This dramatic rise is profound considering complaint data was only available through June 30, 1999. Since 1998, according to the FTC’s website, only one franchise enforcement action was taken against a franchise company. There’s just not enough money or resources available to the FTC, a situation that will only grow worse in the current economy.

My point here is registration of a Franchise Disclosure Document with a governmental agency only means the franchise company paid a filing fee and forwarded its document. There is no due diligence undertaken by examiners in a registration state. So the real guardian of the franchise investment must be you – the franchise investor. Because of the complexities of franchise agreement provisions and offering circular disclosures the need for competent, professional advice is critical. Many of the critical disclosures are required only in a table, where the relevant contract sections of "boilerplate that bites" are listed, without going into any "details." If you’re not a franchise attorney looking for red flags, it easy to get duped.

Breakeven Point

Returning to the Franchise Disclosure Document, critical business information is NOT disclosed in the document, principally due to lobbying by the franchise industry. For example, the time it takes to reach the break even point – where revenues cover expenses – is not required disclosure in any franchise disclosure document. A bank would never loan money without this critical financial milestone, yet franchise companies let franchise buyers invest hundreds of thousands of dollars, often mortgaging their homes and tapping into savings and retirement accounts. What type of financial milestone must franchise companies disclose before franchise buyers risk what is often everything they have? The relevant disclosure, Item 7, only requires an estimate of what is called “Additional Funds,” a 90-day estimate of working capital needs. Because many new franchises can take a year, two years or more to reach the break even point, knowing only what it’s going to take to get you through the first 90 days is not helpful – in fact it may set you up for financial suicide. If you don&
rsquo;t have enough working capital to reach the break even point, which can be a year or more down the road, your entire franchise investment will go down the drain.

Financial Performance Of Other Franchise Owners

Another major shortcoming of disclosures in the Franchise Disclosure Document is not telling you how much money the franchises in the network are making. Instead of answering what is the most important question in a franchise investment decision, the franchise disclosure laws make this “optional” for the franchise company – they can tell you if they want to. If they decide to answer this critical question, it will be found in Item 19. But don’t hold your breath – more than 90% of franchise companies opt not to answer this question. It’s another bizarre reality in the world of franchising. Because they require complete monthly (and in many cases, weekly) financial profit and loss statements from their franchise owners, the franchise companies know exactly how much their franchises are making (or losing). But more than 90% decide not to say anything before you buy one of their franchises.

Asking Current Franchise Owners

Of course, current franchise owners are a potential source of information and a list of these are found in an exhibit to the Franchise Disclosure Document. My experience is most franchise owners exaggerate their financial performance or decline to share their finances with a stranger. Many of them I’ve spoken with over 28-plus years claimed they were making good money, when a studied examination of their financial statements revealed they were either losing money or operating at or below minimum wage performance. One couple invested $200,000 in a pizza franchise and were desperate to sell it eighteen months later. Their financial statements showed they were making about $0.50 (fifty cents) per hour. Fortunately, my client promptly lost interest in buying the franchise after listening to my analysis. The incredible thing is I discovered the franchise was subsequently sold to another person who operated the business for a year then filed for bankruptcy. There are many more examples of these franchise nightmares. Franchise "resales" where unprofitable franchises are sold over and over are another bizarre reality in the world of franchising.

Copyright 2007-2009 Kevin B. Murphy, B.S., M.B.A., J.D. – all rights reserved

For more informatiion, visit the Franchise Foundations website.

 

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